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Abstract. Low-end embedded devices and the Internet of Things (IoT)
are becoming increasingly important for our lives. They are being used in
domains such as infrastructure management, and medical and healthcare
systems, where business interests and our security and privacy are at
stake. Yet, security mechanisms have been appallingly neglected on many
IoT platforms. In this paper we present a secure access control mechanism
for extremely lightweight embedded microcontrollers. Being based on
Sancus, a hardware-only Trusted Computing Base and Protected Module
Architecture for the embedded domain, our mechanism allows for mul-
tiple software modules on an IoT-node to securely share resources. We
implement and evaluate our approach for two application scenarios, a
shared memory system and a shared flash drive. Our implementation is
based on a Sancus-enabled TI MSP430 microcontroller. We show that our
mechanism can give high security guarantees at small runtime overheads
and a moderately increased size of the Trusted Computing Base.
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1 Introduction
Ongoing developments in our ever-changing computing environment have led to
a situation where every physical object can have a virtual counterpart on the
Internet. These virtual representations of things provide and consume services and
can be assigned to collaborate towards achieving a common goal. This Internet
of Things (IoT) brings us unpreceded convenience through novel possibilities to
acquire and process data from our environment. With numerous applications in
domains such as infrastructure management, transportation, and medical and
healthcare systems, the increasing growth of the IoT raises questions regarding
the safe and secure deployment and use of extremely interconnected devices.
Computing nodes in the IoT are often equipped with inexpensive low-performance
microcontrollers that provide just enough computing power to periodically per-
form their intended tasks, e.g., obtain sensor readings and pass them on to
other nodes. As a result, well established concepts and mechanisms from desktop
and server environments – hierarchical protection domains, virtualisation, virus
scanners, firewalls, etc. – are either not available or cannot easily be employed
on IoT-nodes [17].
The problem of trustworthiness and trust management of low-power low-
performance computing nodes has previously been discussed in the context
of sensor networks [8,14]. Most techniques proposed for this domain focus on
observing the communication behaviour and on validating the plausibility of
sensor readings to assess the trustworthiness of nodes, which is shown to reliably
detect the systematic failure nodes. Yet mechanisms to protect software and data
on a node are rare as most work in this domain focuses on efficiency and handles
security and privacy requirements as second-class citizens at best.
Contributions. In this paper we describe and evaluate an approach to implement
and securely enforce application-grained access control policies for IoT-nodes.
Our access control mechanism can manage access to various system resources
such as a file systems, Memory-Mapped I/O (MMIO) devices or specific devices
attached to an external communication bus. While incurring low overheads, our
mechanism guarantees at runtime that only authenticated software modules gain
access to resources as specified in the policy; the internal state of the access
control implementation is protected and cannot be tampered with.
Our approach is based on Sancus [16], a lightweight hardware-only Trusted
Computing Base (TCB) and Protected Module Architecture (PMA) [18]. Sancus
targets low-cost embedded systems which have no virtual memory. Recent research
on Program Counter Based Access Control (PCBAC) [19] shows that, in this
context, the value of the program counter can be used unambiguously to identify
a specific software module. Whenever the program counter is within the address
range associated with the module’s code, the module is said to be executing.
Memory isolation can then be implemented by configuring access rights to memory
locations based on the current value of the program counter. Sancus also provides
attestation by means of built-in cryptographic primitives to provide assurance of
the integrity and isolation of a given software module to a third party, which we
use to authenticate software modules.
We evaluate a prototypic implementation of our access control mechanism in
two application scenarios that facilitate secure data sharing between software
modules, (1) through a shared memory implementation and (2) through peripheral
flash memory and the Coffee [20] file system. Our evaluation shows that module
isolation and access control impose relatively low overheads that should be
acceptable in deployment scenarios with stringent safety and security requirements.
The application scenarios run on a Sancus-enabled TI MSP430 microcontroller, a
single-address-space architecture with no memory management unit. The source
code of the evaluation scenario is available at https://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.
be/software/sancus/wistp2015/.
2 Protected Module Architectures and Sancus
As mentioned in the introduction, our work is built upon Sancus [16], a lightweight
PMA [18] specifically designed for embedded systems. Sancus guarantees strong
isolation of software modules, called Sancus Modules (SMs), through low-cost
hardware extensions. Moreover, Sancus provides the means for local and remote
parties to attest the state of, or communicate with, the isolated software modules.
This section gives a detailed introduction of the features of Sancus we use in the
rest of this paper.
Isolation. Like many PMAs, Sancus uses PCBAC [19] to isolate SMs. Software
modules are represented by a public text section containing the module’s exe-
cutable code and a private data section containing data that should be kept
private to the module. The core of the PCBAC model is that the private data
section of a module can only be accessed from code in its public text section. In
other words, if and only if the program counter points to within a module’s code
section, memory access to this module’s data section is allowed. Note that on
systems that use MMIO, an SM can get exclusive access to a device by mapping
its private data section around the MMIO region of the device.
To prevent instruction sequences in the code section from being misused
by external code to extract private data, entry into a module’s code section
should be controlled. For this purpose, PMAs allow modules to designate certain
addresses within their code section as entry points. Code that does not belong
to a module’s code section is only allowed to jump to one of its entry points. In
Sancus, every module has a single entry point at the start of its code section.
Table 1 gives an overview of the access control rules enforced by Sancus.
Table 1. Memory access control rules enforced by Sancus using the traditional Unix
notation. Each entry indicates how code executing in the “from” section may access the
“to” section. The “unprotected” section refers to code that does not belong to a SM.
From/to Entry Text Data Unprotected
Entry r-x r-x rw- rwx
Text r-x r-x rw- rwx
Unprotected/
Other SM r-x r-- --- rwx
SM Identification. Sancus allows SMs to reliably identify each other. To this
end, Sancus assigns a unique ID to each SM when its isolation is enabled. The
instruction sancus get id can be used to retrieve the ID of an SM at a specific
address. This can be used to, for example, verify the expected SM is isolated at
a specific location before calling its entry point.
To enable the implementation of access control policies, Sancus keeps track
of the ID of the previously executing SM. This ID can be queried using the
sancus get caller id instruction. SMs typically use this feature to restrict
access to their entry point to some specific SMs.
Besides enabling SMs to identify each other, Sancus also provides crypto-
graphic primitives for modules to attest each other’s state. That is, to verify that
a module’s code section has not been tampered with before the isolation was
enabled and that its code and data sections are loaded at the correct addresses.
For this, Sancus employs an elaborate key management scheme that is beyond
the scope of this paper. Suffices to say that SMs can be deployed with a Message
Authentication Code (MAC) of the code section and load addresses of a module it
needs to attest and Sancus provides instructions to verify that the actual isolated
module corresponds to this MAC.
Sancus Module Compilation. To securely create SMs for Sancus, a number of
specifics have to be considered. For example, every SM needs a separate stack in
its private data section to ensure the integrity of control data and local variables.
Also, whenever exiting an SM, registers need to be cleared to avoid data leakage.
The Sancus distribution includes a C compiler to automate the process of creating
SMs. The compiler generates the necessary entry and exit stubs to deal with
intricacies mentioned above. Moreover, the compiler allows for the definition of
multiple entry points that are dispatched from the single physical entry point
supported by Sancus. A generic approach to securely compiling high-level code
to low-level language with fine-grained memory access control is presented in [1].
3 Motivation & Related Work
In this section, we introduce the need for a secure embedded file system and
discuss this in the light of recent related research. In a wider context, our
prototype demonstrates the feasibility of encapsulating and controlling access to
a shared system resource through a lightweight trusted software layer on top of
hardware-enforced mechanisms.
3.1 Embedded File System Security
Existing embedded file systems [6,5] focus mainly on performance aspects: flash
specific optimisations, RAM usage and energy consumption, whereas file pro-
tection is non-existing or remains very limited. This is in line with the original
concept of a single static unprotected embedded application. Indeed, the design
notes for Matchbox, a file system for TinyOS, state literally: “We do not need:
Security in any form, [...]” [7]. As another example, Contiki features the Coffee
file system [20], a dedicated lightweight flash file system without any form of
access control. LiteOS [4] provides its own LiteFS UNIX-like file system in which
files may represent data, binaries or devices. It also offers a coarse-grained user-
oriented protection mechanism that classifies all users in one of three levels, each
with its own rwx mode bits.
We argue that in an embedded context, featuring a dynamic multi-stakeholder
deployment model, it is software modules rather than users that represent the
unit of file protection. Indeed, recall from Sec. 2 that an SM represents the
unit of memory protection and authentication. Extending these guarantees with
SM-grained protection for shared system resources would thus be valuable.
File protection on a per-SM-basis would furthermore be interesting as it differs
from conventional UNIX-like user-oriented file protection [2]. UNIX decides file
access based on the identity of the owner of the currently executing program. This
coarse grained scheme does however not shield a user from malicious programs
that run with her permissions [3]. Moreover, fine-grained file protection is hindered
by the default owner/group/others file attributes. Capability-based process-
specific file protection for UNIX has been proposed [3] as a countermeasure and
fine-grained access control can be accomplished with access control lists [9].
3.2 Secure Resource Sharing
PMAs reorganise an unprotected single-address-space into a set of hardware-
delimited protected SM enclaves. Secluding SMs in their respective protection
domains allows strong security guarantees on the one hand, but also limits the
overall flexibility of the system. Indeed, Sancus [16] does not natively support
complex policies, such as dynamically allocating and sharing of protected memory,
or fine-grained peripheral access control. In this respect, our protected file system
serves as a case study on how to encapsulate a typical shared system resource
(i.e. secondary storage) in its own protection domain with flexible SM-grained
access control policies.
Self Protecting OS Modules. An SM should either fulfil its own needs or
rely on the services of an untrusted OS to interact with the outside world. This
implies poor trade-offs between flexibility and protection. Consider for example
an SM that wants to save confidential data in a file system or read secret values
from a sensor. Without additional support this SM would have to either claim
the file system / sensor for itself, effectively denying others access to the resource,
or accept to use it in an unprotected way.
The key idea we explore in our secure file system prototype is to mitigate this
flexibility vs. protection trade-off by adding a level of indirection. In our setup,
we build upon the existing Sancus primitives to provide a dedicated module
SMserver with exclusive access to a system resource and we implement a thin
software layer on top to enforce flexible access control policies. Sancus’ hardware
logic ensures SMserver is solely responsible for the resource it encapsulates. This
shows that even though this intermediate SM performs a typical OS task – shared
resource management – it differs significantly from a conventional omnipotent
trusted kernel software layer.
Secure resource sharing for PMAs thus requires a disjoint set of self protecting
OS modules. Every such module encapsulates and controls access to a platform
resource (e.g. a protected memory buffer, a file system, a keyboard, a network
interface, etc.). This way, client SMs that use its services are offered availability
and access control guarantees.
Zero-Software Microkernel. The idea of implementing the OS as a set of
non-privileged modules echoes the widely known microkernel approach [12,13]. In
a microkernel architecture all non-essential OS services – such as device drives, file
systems, process management, etc. – are implemented as regular user programs,
known as servers. The main task of the privileged microkernel is to separate the
applications from each others and provide inter-process communication between
them. User programs and servers always communicate indirectly through the
microkernel. From a security perspective, a true microkernel limits the TCB by
reducing the kernel’s size. The actual OS services are implemented in user space
on top of these abstractions.
There is no consensus on which mechanisms should be implemented in the
microkernel. In a way, the Sancus platform is a truly minimal zero-software
microkernel that provides two basic mechanisms to SMs: memory isolation and
authentication. The question then becomes whether such a zero-software micro-
kernel is sufficient to securely implement OS-like services on top. In this respect,
Liedtke [12,13] identifies only three basic abstractions for his minimalist second
generation L4 software microkernel: address spaces, inter-process communication
and threads. He argues a microkernel has to “hide the hardware concept of ad-
dress spaces, since otherwise, implementing protection would be impossible.” [12].
The Sancus platform provides fine-grained hardware-enforced protection domains
in a single-address-space. Furthermore, Liedtke identifies the need for a micro-
kernel to “establish a communication channel which can neither be corrupted
nor eavesdropped” and states “uids are required for reliable and efficient local
communication” [12]. This clearly resembles Sancus’ hardware-supplied unique
SM IDs and attestation features.
Our protected file system prototype, SMsfs, demonstrates Sancus’ hardware-
enforced mechanisms are sufficient to realise SM-grained logical file access restric-
tions. SMsfs offers security guarantees similar to those of user-space file system
server which is effectively shielded from other protection domains. Moreover, a
client is ensured confidentiality and integrity when communicating with SMsfs.
Importantly, Sancus realises these security guarantees without any trusted soft-
ware layer. Its hardware-enforced protection scheme indeed makes an omnipotent
kernel layer inherently impossible.
3.3 Application Scenarios
The problem domain of low-end embedded devices is characterised by conflict-
ing interests between economic considerations on the one hand and security
requirements on the other. Sancus presents the SM as the unit of lightweight
memory isolation and authentication. Our protected file system SMsfs module
supplements these hardware-enforced security properties with logical file access
control guarantees by means of an explicit software TCB. It thus shows the
feasibility of securely sharing system resources on a per-SM-basis.
Protected Shared Memory. Being able to pass a moderate sized buffer
securely between protection domains is useful in many contexts. A first scenario
concerns parameter passing of large values. Indeed, one can only pass parameters
securely through a limited number of CPU registers when calling an SM [16].
Protected shared memory is also useful in the context of secure I/O. Recall
from Sec. 2 that an SM can be provided with exclusive access to a MMIO
peripheral. As an example, a keyboard driver module SMkeyboard could offer an
entry function to get an input line confidentially from the user. The module may
then use protected shared memory to pass the result to a client SM.
Secondary Storage. Several authors identify an emerging application area for
embedded platforms using secondary storage file systems [6,5,20]. In a multi-
stakeholder model with software extensibility by multiple untrustworthy vendors,
fine-grained access control for secondary storage resources is essential. Consider
for example a low-end extensible wearable device. One application could save
sensitive medical logs in the file system; another one could simultaneously use
the file system to save privacy-sensitive data such as environment sensor data,
recordings, GPS locations, etc. Needless to say reliable and fine-grained memory
protection and file access control is imperative in such a system.
4 Design and Implementation of a Protected File System
In this section, we present a protected file system for the Sancus platform [16].
The file system is encapsulated in its own SMsfs protection domain with exclusive
access to the storage device, ensuring file system integrity. Furthermore, our file
system realises SM-specific access control, allowing fine-grained access control
policies for logical file sharing between SMs.
4.1 Layered Design
The protected file system depicted in Fig. 1 features a layered design with a
front-end access control layer deciding access to a private back-end software layer,
encapsulating the actual resource. From the point of view of the front-end, the
back-end is an abstract Contiki File System (CFS) interface implementation
that can be plugged in when compiling the SMsfs module. We provide two
different back-end implementations. Section 4.3 discusses an implementation that
operates on a Sancus-protected memory buffer, allowing a form of protected
shared memory between SMs. Section 4.4 plugs in a real-world embedded flash
file system, realising SM-grained protection on a shared system resource.
From a security perspective, the front- and back-end are merely a logical
structure, as the entire file system runs in a single protection domain SMsfs. The
front-end offers the public interface (i.e. SMsfs’s entry points) towards clients,
whereas the back-end is called through private non-entry functions. As the PMA
hardware guarantees a protection domain can only be entered from its predefined
entry points, a client is effectively prohibited from bypassing the access-control
front-end and calling the back-end directly.
The division of responsibilities between the front- and back-end is as follows.
The front-end presents a transparent UNIX like file system interface towards
client SMs to provide them with the concept of a contiguous logical file with
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Fig. 1. Our protected file system SMsfs module consists of a generic public front-end
access control layer controlling access to a pluggable private back-end software layer,
encapsulating the actual resource.
offset-addressable content. Internally however, the front-end is only concerned
with SM-oriented access control policies and maintains the data structures to do
so. It relies on the back-end CFS implementation for the concept of a logical file.
The back-end in its turn encapsulates the actual file system implementation and
is completely unaware of any access control going on. It is important to note here
that the front-end has no notion of persistence and stores all its access control
data structures in volatile protected memory. Our SMsfs prototype does not
support persistent SM-grained file protection (c.f. Sec. 6) since it uses Sancus’
unique hardware IDs that do not last over multiple boot cycles [16].
4.2 Generic Front-End Access Control Layer
The front-end is conceived as a wrapper implementation that associates an access
control list (ACL) of (ID, permissions flag) pairs per logical file to validate
the caller’s permissions before passing the call to the back-end.
Software-Module-Grained Access Control. Recall from Sec. 2 that the
IDs, uniquely identifying a Sancus module within one boot cycle, are inherently
unforgeable as they are exclusively managed by hardware. They can therefore
safely be used for subsequent client authentications in a software layer. Es-
sentially, the front-end accomplishes its access control guarantees through the
sancus get caller id hardware instruction, which it uses to reliably retrieve
the ID of the client – i.e. the SM that entered the currently executing module.
To realise our protected file system prototype SMsfs, we build upon Sancus’
hardware-enforced security guarantees in two ways. On the one hand, Sancus’
memory isolation techniques grant SMsfs exclusive access to its back-end resource.
On the other hand, Sancus’ SM identification scheme provides SMsfs with a
reliable client authentication mechanism that allows implementing a thin software
layer to realise flexible access control policies for its private back-end resource.
Interface. We based our Sancus File System (SFS) interface on the UNIX-like
Contiki File System (CFS) interface [20], modifying it where needed and extending
it with SM-specific access control functions. Specifically, we had to replace the
cfs read and cfs write functions, requiring a pointer to an unprotected memory
buffer and a length argument, with sfs getc and sfs putc functions, which
pass the arguments and return values securely through CPU registers. For the
same reason we had to replace file name strings with single chars.
In addition, our interface supports SM-specific access control. Using the
sfs chmod function, the software module that first created a file can assign or
revoke fine-grained permissions for a specific SM via a bit flag. Currently our
prototype supports read-only, write-only and read-write permissions, but due to
the generic access control scheme, more advanced policies such as append-only
could be added relatively easy. Client SMs open files through a modified sfs open
function, requiring a permissions flag argument and an initial size hint which is
passed to the back-end.
Data Structures. Our prototype stores all access control data structures in its
protected private data section. It employs a linked list for logical files, each with
a corresponding SM-grained permission ACL. This allows a two phase permission
lookup procedure when specifying a file by name. The file list is first traversed to
locate the file, using the name as a key. Thereafter, the corresponding ACL is
searched using the calling SM’s ID as a key. To speed up future accesses, using a
file descriptor, we employ a fixed-sized file-descriptor-indexed array with pointers
to the corresponding ACL entry.
On each function call, before translating the call to the CFS back-end, the
front-end validates the caller’s permissions. If the caller passes a file descriptor,
the implementation first checks whether it is in the expected range and points to
an ACL entry that belongs to the caller. Furthermore, to allow safe revocation of
earlier assigned permissions, SMsfs closes any remaining open file descriptors
when revoking a permission – as opposed to the POSIX standard [10] which
leaves such behaviour implementation-defined.
As Sancus [16] requires the protected memory section of an SM to be fixed-
sized during the SM’s lifetime, SMsfs should fulfil its own dynamic protected
memory requirements. To do so, our implementation enforces a maximum number
of open file descriptors, pre-allocates a fixed number of file and permission structs
at compile time and maintains them in a free list at run time. When running out
of protected memory, the front-end rejects requests to create additional files.
4.3 Protected Shared Memory Back-End
In the protected shared memory implementation, the back-end operates on a
fixed-sized Sancus-protected memory buffer. Internally, we use a dynamic memory
allocation malloc implementation on this buffer, allowing clients to transparently
claim a portion of the buffer through a UNIX-like API.
Logical files in the protected shared memory back-end have a fixed size during
their lifetime. When creating a new file, the implementation uses the initial size
argument to allocate a buffer of the corresponding size. From then on, it does
proper bounds checking, refusing to seek beyond the buffer’s end.
Files are arranged in a linked list, each element containing a pointer to
a location inside the private malloc buffer and the corresponding size. As in
the front-end, we maintain a file-descriptor-indexed array to speed up common
file operations and to store the current client-specific logical file offset. This
bookkeeping information must also reside in protected memory. To support a
dynamic number of logical files, the prototype implementation allocates the
required structs using its own protected malloc buffer.
4.4 Protected Shared Flash Storage
The research presented here adopts Contiki’s open source Coffee FS [20] as our
case study flash file system back-end. Coffee FS is highly optimised for small
flash memories, requires a small and constant RAM footprint per open file and
does not provide any existing file protection mechanism.
The shared flash storage back-end introduces the important issue of secure
peripherals [11]. Indeed, SMsfs should be provided with exclusive access to the
flash drive to ensure file system integrity and confidentiality. For peripherals that
are being accessed through the memory address space, Sancus’ program counter
based memory access control scheme grants a dedicated driver SM exclusive
access to a resource by including the relevant MMIO addresses in its private data
section [16]. The driver module then mutually authenticates with SMsfs, using
attestation as discussed in Sec. 2, to realise end-to-end file system protection.
5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the protected file system SMsfs prototype; our
implementation and evaluation suite are available online. We discuss runtime
overhead as well as the induced memory footprint and code size. We define total
runtime overhead from a client SM’s perspective as the additional number of
CPU cycles needed to call an SMsfs entry function, compared to calling the
respective function of an unprotected file system. Furthermore, we split the
overall overhead into a Sancus-dictated component, induced by switching Sancus
protection domains, and an implementation-dependent component caused by the
access control layer. Finally, we provide the relative overhead for the protected
shared memory and Coffee flash file system back-ends.
All experiments were conducted on a Sancus-enabled MSP430 FPGA running
at 20 MHz. The FPGA is connected to a Micron M25P16 serial flash drive,
using the Coffee file system from Contiki release 2.7. For technical details on the
MSP430 and Sancus extensions we refer the reader to [16].
Sancus Protection Domain Switching. As explained in Sec. 2, SMs need
entry and exit code stubs that take care of private call-stack switching and
clearing of CPU registers to avoid leaking of confidential data. These code stubs
thus incur overhead for function calls that switch protection domains. The exact
number of cycles needed for such a function call varies with the number and size
of the arguments and return value. Calling an unprotected function from within
a module SMA takes between 120 and 170 cycles, whereas calling an SMB entry
function from within SMA requires between 210 and 280 cycles.
These results indicate an additional Sancus-dictated overhead of roughly
100 cycles for client SMs calling our protected SMsfs module, as opposed to
calling an unprotected file system. Note that this overhead is solely caused by
encapsulating the file system in its own protection domain SMsfs, independent
from any additional access control logic.
Access Control Overhead. We first provide micro benchmarks of the access
control front-end layer. The last column of Tab. 2 shows the total number of CPU
cycles needed for a protected client SMA to call our protected file system SMsfs
configured with a dummy back-end. The “Sancus Induced” column lists the
number of cycles thereof caused by calling the respective Sancus entry function,
depending on the number of arguments. These numbers are responsible for the
vast majority of cycles, illustrating how SMsfs realises SM-grained access control
policies through a thin software layer on top of Sancus.
Table 2. The number of cycles needed for SMsfs configured with a dummy back-end,
assuming a single open file with one ACL entry. The “Sancus Induced” column lists
the number of cycles needed to call the respective SMsfs entry function. The next two
columns show the overhead of the front-end and the last column lists the summation.
SFS API Sancus Front-End Induced Total
function case Induced ACL checks back-end call
format 211 181 17 409
open creat 279 120 69 468
open exist 259 95 69 423
seek 259 18 58 335
getc 229 46 59 334
putc 234 55 63 352
close 229 56 24 309
remove 226 138 27 391
chmod add 247 120 0 367
chmod revoke 247 158 0 405
We further detail the overhead induced by the front-end. The “back-end call”
column of Tab. 2 lists the number of cycles needed by the front-end to call the
back-end – the downside of a layered design. The “ACL checks” column shows
the number of cycles needed to traverse the access control data structures, in the
case of a single file and ACL entry. The impact of using the file-descriptor-indexed
array is clearly visible, resulting in a constant and low access control overhead
for the functions seek, getc, putc and close. As explained in Sec. 4.2, our
prototype uses linked lists, resulting in a linear growing access control overhead
for functions without a file descriptor. We experimentally verified the worst-case
overhead indeed grows linearly with a reasonable factor of about 12 extra cycles
per additional logical file or ACL linked list entry.
The memory overhead of our SMsfs prototype is bounded at compile time
by pre-allocating the file descriptor array and a maximum number of structs for
logical files and ACL entries, which is common practice in embedded file systems
(as in the Coffee back-end). Both structs occupy 6 bytes. In our test setup, we
configured the SMsfs module with a maximum number of 10 ACL entries, 5 files
and 8 file descriptor entries, resulting in a total memory usage of 106 bytes. In
terms of code size, the access control layer of SMsfs occupies 1.9 KB, whereas
the Coffee back-end requires 5.3 KB. Our front-end access control layer thus
increases the code size with a factor of 0.36.
Protected Shared Memory Back-End. To investigate the runtime overhead
of the protected file system module SMsfs configured with a shared memory back-
end, we compare it to the case where two SMs communicate via an unprotected
dynamically allocated shared memory buffer in the single-address-space. The
“shm” column of Tab. 3 thus shows our baseline, i.e. the number of cycles needed
to create a shared buffer of size 100 via an unprotected malloc call, read/write
a character and free it.1 The next two columns list the number of cycles needed
for our protected shared memory SMsfs module and the absolute overhead.
The key thing to note here is that, once the unprotected dynamic memory
is allocated, read and write accesses are equivalent to normal memory accesses
and thus require very few cycles. Our SMsfs protected shared memory setup
however adds a level of indirection, implying a huge relative overhead for memory
accesses. Moreover, setting up the memory buffer takes longer as the meta data
structures should be initialised and clients have to open the logical file before
accessing it. Emulating flexible access control policies on top of Sancus’ native
protection model is however for the moment the only way of realising complex
protected interactions between SMs.
Protected Shared Flash Storage Overhead. We investigate the runtime
overhead of our protected SMsfs file system prototype on top of Contiki’s Coffee
FS [20], a typical real-world embedded flash file system. The “coffee” column
of Tab. 3 lists our baseline, i.e. the total number of CPU cycles needed for a
protected client SMA to call an unprotected Coffee flash file system. The “sfs-
coffee” column shows the number of cycles needed by SMA to call our SMsfs
protected file system module, configured with a Coffee back-end. Note that
these numbers reflect the ideal case where the front-end as well as the back-end
implementation and flash driver share the same protection domain SMsfs. In our
test setup the Coffee file system and the flash driver operate in unprotected mode,
see also Sec. 6. We thus arrived at the presented data by carefully subtracting
the fine-grained overhead of switching Sancus protection domains.
1 Recall from Sec. 4.2 that we cannot support a multi-byte read/write API. Read-
ing/writing a buffer will thus need multiple calls to getc/putc.
Table 3. The overhead for a client SMA that uses SMsfs’s services for each back-end,
assuming a single open file with one ACL entry. The “Shared Memory” columns list
from left to right: the number of cycles needed by SMA to use unprotected dynamic
memory, SMsfs with a shared memory back-end and the absolute overhead. The “Flash
Storage Back-End” columns list from left to right, the number of cycles needed for SMA
to call: an unprotected Coffee file system, SMsfs with a Coffee back-end; the absolute
and relative overhead and the overhead percentage induced by the ACL lookup.
API Shared Memory Flash Storage Back-End
baseline overhead baseline overhead
function case shm sfs-shm shm-abs coffee sfs-coffee abs rel acl
format - 584 584 360 e6 360 e6 286 0 63
open creat 192 1,326 1,134 76,133 76,436 303 0 40
open exist - 706 706 2,604 2,862 258 10 37
seek - 322 322 430 594 181 44 10
getc 2 342 340 902 1,081 179 20 26
putc 4 351 347 1,288 1,485 197 15 28
close - 539 539 317 498 181 57 31
remove 192 670 478 8,033 8,293 260 3 53
chmod add - 367 367 - 367 367 - 33
chmod revoke - 405 405 - 405 405 - 39
The “abs” column of Tab. 3 lists the absolute number of overhead cycles caused
by the protected file system implementation, as compared to the unprotected
Coffee setup. To interpret these numbers, the next columns provide the relative
overhead and the percentage of the total overhead that is caused by the access
control front-end implementation. These results indicate the overhead of protected
resource sharing on top of a real-world flash file system is reasonable. Due to the
delay of the flash I/O and the file-descriptor-indexed array, the relative number of
additional cycles remains limited for commonly used file operations: under 20 %
for getc and putc; it even drops to zero for I/O-heavy operations such as format,
creat and remove. Moreover, the additional SM-specific chmod access control
function consumes a number of cycles of the same magnitude as the unprotected
in-memory file operations, such as seek. Finally, the front-end access control
software layer shows to be lightweight in the sense that over half of SMsfs’s
overhead – in the case of a single file and ACL entry – can be attributed to
calling the respective Sancus entry function and the back-end function call.
Comparing the two back-ends reveals another characteristic of SM interactions:
the relative overhead of switching protection domains decreases as the execution
time of the callee module increases. Specifically, the relative overhead of SMsfs
with a flash back-end is reduced by the flash I/O delay, whereas fast unprotected
memory access aggravates overheads in the protected shared memory case.
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the security guarantees and limitations of our protected
file system SMsfs prototype.
Trusted Computing Base. Our SMsfs module builds upon Sancus’ existing
hardware primitives [16] to supplement the hardware-enforced security guarantees
of its clients with logical file access restrictions. Clients using SMsfs naturally
incorporate it in their TCB. Our approach differs significantly from a traditional
trusted OS computing base however for two major reasons.
Firstly, only client SMs using SMsfs have to trust SMsfs and Sancus offers
strong authentication to verify SMsfs. A client can attest an SM, guaranteeing
that, i.e., SMsfs has not been tampered with and was loaded correctly, with
exclusive access to the MMIO flash drive addresses. This results in a small explicit
TCB, as opposed to the implicit TCB induced by an omnipotent trusted kernel.
Second, the SMsfs module is solely entrusted its dedicated file system task,
echoing the well known principle of least privilege. Thus, a faulty SMsfs module
can only tamper with or leak the file system data it is entrusted. A client SM
still preserves exclusive access to its private section. In this, SMsfs’s security
guarantees are similar to those of a microkernel file system running in user space
as it is shielded from other protection domains. Notably, Sancus does not rely on
any trusted kernel software layer to enforce this separation.
Limitations. We acknowledge several limitations in our SMsfs prototype.
Firstly, in our test setup, the Coffee file system back-end runs in unprotected
mode. We believe that protecting the Coffee implementation by an SM is relatively
easy, albeit out of scope for the work presented in this paper.
A second limitation concerns the protected flash driver. Currently Sancus’
program counter based memory access control hardware logic only allows a single
contiguous private data section per Sancus module [16]. This implies that a
module including a MMIO address range in its private data section, cannot
at the same time have protected data. Moreover, as it cannot safely provide
the stack needed by higher level programming languages, its corresponding
code section should be entirely implemented in assembly. We therefore need
a separate dedicated flash driver SM, exclusively communicating with SMsfs.
From a security perspective, there is no real issue here, but switching protection
domains decreases the performance, as explained in Sec. 5. In a real-world setup
however, Sancus’ program counter based access control logic [16] could relatively
easy be extended to allow a MMIO address range as well as another contiguous
protected address range in a single protection domain SMsfs.
Finally, SMsfs ensures confidentiality and integrity of logical files as long as
it is up and running (which can be verified by the client), but does not persist
these guarantees across reboots. Indeed, since the IDs assigned to SMs by Sancus,
do not persist after reboots (see Sec. 2), they may change when redeploying an
SM. We argue that extending SMsfs’s file protection guarantees across reboots is
non-trivial, as anything could happen between crashing of the node and successful
redeployment of SMsfs. In this respect, our protected file system does also not
protect against physically removing and reading out the flash drive. This matches
Sancus’ attacker model [16] which does not consider attackers with physical
access to the hardware. The only way to protect against such attacks and to
support persistent file protection would be to encrypt all data on the flash disk
with SMsfs’s Sancus-provided private key. Such an approach would however
dramatically reduce performance, especially since all data is transferred safely
through CPU registers on a byte-per-byte basis. Moreover, there would be little
advantage over the situation where clients encrypt the data themselves before
passing it to SMsfs or even an unprotected file system.
We therefore consider our protected file system SMsfs module as a way for
SMs to extend their fixed sized private data section considerably, while at the
same time offering flexible access control guarantees. In this respect, it could be
an interesting future work direction to ensure the hardware automatically clears
the flash drive on system boot – even before SMsfs is deployed – to enforce the
non-persistence of file system data.
7 Conclusion
Low-end embedded devices are becoming increasingly present and interconnected
in our everyday lives. Adequate software isolation for these platforms is crucial
in a multi-stakeholder context. In this perspective, PMAs offer strong hardware-
enforced memory isolation and authentication guarantees, but cannot realise
flexible access control policies for shared system resources. SMs should either
claim the resource for themselves or rely on the services of an untrusted OS when
interacting with the outside world.
In this paper we presented a protected file system SMsfs module that builds
upon existing PMA hardware primitives to construct a software layer that realises
access control, i.e. logical file protection guarantees for client SMs. In a broader
perspective, this demonstrates the feasibility of supplementing the hardware-
enforced security properties offered by PMAs with SM-grained access control
guarantees enforced by a protected software TCB.
While our implementation is based on Sancus [16], a hardware-only TCB
for lightweight embedded microcontrollers, our approach is fairly general and
can be implemented with other PMAs that provide (1) memory isolation, (2) at-
testation guarantees and (3) exclusive use of MMIO ranges. Yet, to the best
of our knowledge, Sancus is the only PMA satisfying all these requirements in
the embedded world. In server and desktop computing, our approach can be
implemented using a trusted hypervisor and a PMA such as Intel’s SGX [15].
Since SGX enclaves cannot claim MMIO ranges directly, a rather large software
TCB would be necessary.
In the future we will further investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of our
access control mechanism based on extended evaluation scenarios that allow for
meaningful macro-benchmarks. A particularly interesting scenario would be to
provide access control for I/O devices connected to a peripheral bus.
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